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Jacques et al Congenital Heart Diseasestenosis in stage 2 conventional strategies (20%) versus that
in hybrid stage 2 strategies (62%). The long-term impact on
the Fontan circulation remains to be determined.C
H
DStudy Limitations
Medical errors are difficult to accurately identify. We
attempted to use a thorough and introspective approach. Iron-
ically, we could err in our estimate of error and may have
overestimated its occurrence, although the literature would
suggest that we would underestimate it.25 The indistinct dif-
ference between ‘‘errors’’ and some ‘‘complications’’ is also
challenging. Leape and colleagues1 report that the line be-
tweenpreventable errors and ineluctable complications along
the spectrumof adverse events is amoving target that evolves
with increasing knowledge, that is, ineluctable complications
of today may become known as medical errors tomorrow. In
quality assessment and safety literature, it is recognized that
complications are too frequently regarded as being immuta-
ble and underreported, especially those occurring during pro-
longed hospitalization.25 Self-fulfillment, a situation in
which avoiding gaps in performance is not possible because
of preceding events, is another limitation. Errors are interde-
pendent and act synergistically on outcomes, and their intrin-
sic effect is sometime difficult to circumscribe.
Although the entire documented patient course was
assessed through stage 2, transplantation, or death, some
errors could have been missed because of a lack of docu-
mentation or granularity in documentation. This study is
an initial attempt at understanding error in this cohort. Pro-
spective evaluation will lead to enhanced understanding,
particularly with respect to work organization such as lead-
ership, hierarchy, and communication. A third-party con-
current observation would be of particular value.CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the majority of children with HLHS and
physiologic equivalents who underwent surgical palliation
had an occurrence of medical error. Errors were most com-
mon in the intraoperative or postoperative windows. Tech-
nical intraoperative errors delayed patient recovery but
did not influence the risk of strategy failure (likely because
lethal errors were corrected in the same operative setting).
Intraoperative judgment errors affected survival in a univar-
iate analysis and led to increased PEs in a multivariate
model. PEs were reliable determinants of strategy failure
in a multivariable model. The occurrence of a PE decreases
transplant-free survival by 15% to 20%. Understanding
patterns of errors and using strategies to decrease errors
hold the possibility of improving patient outcome.References
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Discussion
Dr Emile Bacha (New York, NY). I have to compliment you and
Dr Van Arsdell on a courageous study. It is never easy to admit
having made a mistake, especially if a patient’s life is on thediovascular Surgery c Volume 145, Number 6 1473
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Dline. However, it is also the first step toward learning from our mis-
takes, and you could call it a first step toward redemption. In fact,
past errors properly documented can be seen as a form of negative
knowledge.
Studies in the field of action science such as this one are difficult
because they are inherently subjective. This leads me to my first
question. How were the errors adjudicated? Was it by expert con-
sensus or a single physician?
Dr Jacques. That is correct. For a contextual explanation, the
multidisciplinary senior authors had previously performed a con-
sensus-based review for 10 years of our institutional congenital
cardiac surgery–related mortality. Through that process we had
achieved a standardized approach for identifying and labeling er-
ror and thus were comfortable with the single senior review. This
study was a subsequent study that looked not only at mortality (nu-
merator) but also at the survivors (denominator) so that there could
be a better understanding of the relation between all errors identi-
fied and their potential impact on outcomes.
Dr Bacha. So it was a single person, not a group of experts,
deciding what was an error and what was not, correct?
Dr Jacques. Correct, but based on the methodology, that was
including critical care and cardiology staff.
Dr Bacha. That is certainly one weakness of the study. How do
you explain the seemingly contradictory information of the high
stage 1 intraoperative error rate of 58%, a high percentage of which
was not detected; by your own article, 84% of judgment errors
were not detected in the operating room, and 63% of technical
errors were not detected, yet you have an acceptable operative
mortality of 16% in the stage 1 operation. That is equivalent to
other large centers. How do you explain that contradiction?
Dr Jacques. Every patient has an intraoperative echocardio-
graphic evaluation in the operating room so that we can identify
any major anatomic problem, such as Damus–Kaye–Stansel
obstruction. We try to identify any occurrence of and solve all
potentially lethal anatomic problems before leaving the operating
room. I forgot the subsequent part of your question.
Dr Bacha. You have a high error rate and some recovery, but
your outcomes are good. So you are saying your recovery, that
is, your compensation mechanisms, are robust. That’s what you’re
telling us, right?
Dr Jacques. Yes. It is important to understand that a number of
minor technical issues, such as a small amount of pulmonary artery
narrowing, were identified only on postoperative studies. Because
they were less than optimal findings, they were labeled as a techni-
cal issue but stratified and estimated in the article as having no
impact on clinical outcome.
Dr Bacha. Did you stratify errors by surgeon or level of
experience?
Dr Jacques. It is a subanalysis that we are planning to do, but
not at this point.
Dr Bacha. Your errors, again, were lumped into 2 fairly wide
categories, technical or judgment for intraoperative errors and
judgment and management for PEs. Of course, there are many
types of errors. There are even specific taxonomy systems that al-
low you to place errors into specific categories, errors of omission,
observational errors, communication errors, conceptual errors, and
so forth. Would you consider reclassifying your errors in a more
granular way to be able to hone in on specific problems better?1474 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular SurDr Jacques. We used that classification to help us understand
where we might look to make improvements. It is an interesting
suggestion to look for more granular data; however, it is important
to understand that some errors, such as communication errors,
might be difficult to identify through a chart review.
DrCraig Smith (NewYork, NY). If I worked in your ICU, I think
Iwould be tempted to askwhether this is an exercise in blame-shift-
ing, and I think there is an issue here that I may not be smart enough
to understand statistically. You are describing 4 sequential events,
and the fact that they are sequential might not influence the fre-
quency of events in each episode, but it does seem to me possible
that it would push the impact downstream and make anything
that happens in the fourth episode appear more important than
the things that happened previously. You touch on that possibility
in demonstrating the high interrelatedness between factors, but I
wonder if multivariable analysis is an adequate method for sorting
out the sequential dependencyof early events on subsequent events.
Did you go through this with your statistician?
Dr Jacques. First, it is important to note that this study is not
meant to assign blame. We didn’t know this was going to be the
finding of our study. Outcomes have been fairly steady for 10 or
more years in this vulnerable physiology.Wewanted to see if there
were areas where we, as a team, could improve performance and
thereby potentially enhance outcomes. In our estimate, the best
way to approach this was to look broadly, with respect to time,
areas of care, and definition of optimal.We are sensitive to the con-
cept that this can be viewed as finger pointing. We would note that
the surgeons are actively involved with the decision-making and
interventions during the postoperative intensive care phase—it is
a team effort. Further, a large number of the postoperative identi-
fied errors had to do with decision-making around chest closure
(a surgical decision). The statistical analysis included preopera-
tive/intraoperative information and PEs and was designed to iden-
tify independent factors associated with poor outcome. It could be
that we are solving most of the life-threatening errors in the oper-
ating room by actively addressing echocardiogram-identified
problems at the time. These patients are then rescued but have
a propensity for more postoperative management challenges
because they arrive in a less healthy state of physiology.
Dr Thoralf Sundt (Boston, Mass). I have a concern about your
definition of error and the possibility that you have essentially con-
taminated it with the outcome. This raises potential for confusion
between the occurrence of an error and the occurrence of an
adverse outcome. For example, in an early slide you said you
defined it as an error if the patient was over-anticoagulated and
bled. But isn’t it an error if the patient is over-anticoagulated
regardless of whether he/she bleed, whether there is an adverse
event or not? The importance of this distinction is that if you con-
nect the 2, if you require adverse event in the definition of error,
then your result is a fait accompli; you are destined to show a rela-
tionship between errors and outcomes, which is the principal
finding of your study.
Dr Jacques. This is an important point. We looked for adverse
events that occurred outside of the usual course of the treated dis-
ease. We then determined if these had been affected by a clinical
decision or intervention and if the adverse event was controllable
or uncontrollable. If the event was not controllable, it was consid-
ered a natural complication and not labeled an error. Those thatgery c June 2013
Jacques et al Congenital Heart Diseasewere controllable were considered an error. This is in line with the
seminal publication of Leape and colleagues 20 years ago.
Dr Paul Kirshbom (Atlanta, Ga). I was wondering with this very
nongranular presentation if more granular analysis of your data pre-
sented you with any opportunities to take action. Did you identify
acommonality inyour ICUerrors, forexample,drugdelivery ina large
majority that could be affected by a change in your drug-delivery sys-
tem or any other commonality you could change in the future?
Dr Jacques. Yes, we have identified areas to target. That was
the ultimate goal, but I haven’t been able to detail that aspect inCOMMEN
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The Journal of Thoracic and Carthe presentation. In the postoperative period, ‘‘hinge points’’ are
important. We know that in the intensive care and anesthesia lit-
erature, all the transition points, such as transferring, transport-
ing, and extubating the patient, are important periods. In our
study, ‘‘hinge points of importance’’ are timing of delayed chest
closure, timing of extubation, transfer to the ward, and the
period surrounding the discharge of the patient. These are the
most important areas where we will have to focus. We are
now working on establishing guidelines to improve the care at
these points.TARY C
H
D‘‘Errare humanum est, perseverare autem diabolicum’’ —Lucius
Annaeus Seneca, 4 BC to 45 ADMarc R. de Leval, MD, FRCSMedical outcomes result from complex interactions among
3 sets of variables: those related to the diseases, those
related to the treatments, and those related to the care
providers. The majority of outcome researchers have
concentrated on illness-specific or procedural-related
variables. By and large, human factors related to the
performance of care providers have not been included in
those analyses. Yet investment in human factors has been
shown to improve safety and enhance reliability in high-
technology industries in general and aviation in particular.
High-technology medicine such as cardiac surgery shares
many properties with what is often referred to as complex
social technical systems in which performance depends
on complex individual technical and organizational factors
and their interactions.1
In this issue of the Journal, Jacques and colleagues2
investigate the impact of human errors on team performance
and outcomes of staged palliation of hypoplastic left
heart syndromes and physiologic equivalents. Repairs of
hypoplastic left heart syndromes are models of high-technology surgery par excellence. They have a low error
tolerance requiring a sophisticated organizational structure,
the coordinated efforts of multiple individuals working in
teams, and high levels of cognitive and technical performance.
The authors review the course summaries of 191 patients
undergoing operations in a single institution over a 10-year
period. Technical and judgment errors at each stage of the
Norwood strategywere extracted from these summaries. Hu-
man errors affected approximately 50% of the patients at
both stage I and II of the Norwood strategy. At stage I,
most intraoperative judgment errors are not detected at the
time of the operation. Serious technical errors are
recognized and addressed intraoperatively (30% of patients
at stage I underwent a revision of the repair). Those
revisions were not associated with an increased risk of
strategy failure (death or transplantation), but they delayed
the postoperative recovery. Judgment errors led to an
increase in postoperative errors.
Postoperative errors are the strongest and most reliable
determinants of poor outcomes. The predictors of postoper-
ative errors are the complexity of the morphologic substrate
(more complex patients have a higher risk for error in their
management), and errors in intraoperative surgical judg-
ment increase the risk of postoperative errors. The majority
of postoperative errors after stage I are foreseeable.
Intraoperative errors at stage II did not compromise
outcomes, but despite their low incidence the postoperative
errors did have an impact on outcomes.
This study conveys important messages. In the current
state of the art, the treatment of complex congenital cardiacdiovascular Surgery c Volume 145, Number 6 1475
